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CONVERGE! REIMAGINING THE MOVEMENT TO END GENDER 
VIOLENCE SYMPOSIUM:  
 
Panel on Problematizing Assumptions 
About Gender Violence  







MACDOWELL: As Beth Richie described in her keynote address, 
we are here to reimagine a movement to end gender violence, and that 
goal creates space for a feminist analysis that is at once broader and more 
particularized than the initial feminist analysis of the problem.1 So, for 
example, our analysis can be broader in that we consider the experiences 
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of men as well as women—and, I will argue, perpetrators as well as 
victims. But what do I mean by more particularized? I mean that we can 
consider both parties to a domestic violence case in detail, and in 
relationship to the social stereotypes and norms that adhere to both 
victims and perpetrators. 
The article that I am discussing today, Theorizing from Particularity: 
Perpetrators and Intersectional Theory on Domestic Violence,2 was 
inspired by my experiences representing victims of domestic violence in 
family court, and is part of my effort to try to reconcile inconsistent 
outcomes in those cases. As an example of that phenomenon, I discuss 
two child custody and visitation cases with similar facts tried before the 
same judge. Both involve couples with relatively long histories of 
domestic violence. The last domestic violence incident in both cases had 
happened after a period of separation, occurred in public, and resulted in 
substantial physical injuries to the victims. Both cases had also been 
preceded by a criminal case where the perpetrator had been found guilty 
of misdemeanor domestic violence charges. Thus, in both cases there had 
already been a determination that domestic violence had occurred, what 
had happened, and who had committed the violence. Moreover, under 
applicable state law, the victims met the criteria for a number of different 
kinds of relief, including the issuance of a civil restraining order that 
could protect the children as well as the victim. There was also a 
statutory rebuttable presumption that sole custody should go to the 
victims. Additionally, both victims were seeking supervised visitation 
with the children for the defendant, and there was a statutory requirement 
that the judge consider the safety of the children in making her custody 
decisions, and a strong presumption that supervised visitation was 
appropriate.  
Even with these laws, these orders can nonetheless be very difficult 
to get, as many of you are aware. But one of the victims in these cases, 
who I call Sandra, did get supervised visitation, as well as sole custody. 
The other, who I call Madeline, got custody but was denied supervised 
visitation. Moreover, unlike Sandra, Madeline was treated as blame 
worthy by the judge, who ordered her to attend parenting classes along 
with her children’s father. As Madeline said afterwards, “The judge 
knew I was beat and did not care. I was less than zero.” How can we 
understand these different outcomes? 
Critical feminist theories like intersectionality help us to understand 
why some women may be recognized as victims more readily than others 
because of the ways that dominate social norms about victims interact 
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with race and gender stereotypes. In particular, scholars like Adele 
Morrison and Leigh Goodmark have shown how domestic violence law 
and policy is informed by an ideal of the perfect victim: a female who is 
white, middle class, heterosexual, and passive.3 Women who diverge 





Slide 1 depicts the individual identity of a plaintiff in a domestic 
violence case alongside a co-identity—in this instance, that of the perfect 
victim. However, we know that some women who are unlike the perfect 
victim are successful in cases involving claims of domestic violence, and 
some women who seem more like the perfect victim are unsuccessful. 
The question remains what accounts for the difference? One answer is 
that outcomes also depend on the identity of the perpetrator—the person 
on the other side of the case—who I call the perceivable perpetrator. 
Like the victim identity, the identity of the perpetrator is hinged on 
racialized and sexualized assumptions—this time, about criminality. 
Investigating this question therefore requires extending critical feminist 
theory to perpetrators, who have not typically been the subject of a 
feminist analysis of gender violence. Returning to Slide 1, we must also 
examine the defendant, whose individual identity may converge or 
diverge from the perceivable perpetrator identity. 
                                                                                                         
3 See, e.g., Adele M. Morrison, Changing the Domestic Violence (Dis)Course: 
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(2006); Leigh Goodmark, When Is a Battered Woman Not a Battered Woman? When She 
Fights Back, 20 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 75, 96–113 (2008). 
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Returning to my two family law cases, how did the parties measure 
up to the perfect victim on the one hand and the perceivable perpetrator 





Slide 2 depicts two hexagons crossed by lines that each stands for an 
absolute value: white, middle class, and heteronormative. The dots in the 
hexagon on the left depict where Sandra and Madeline are located in 
relation to those values. Both were heterosexual women employed in 
semi-professional jobs, but they differ in other ways. The successful 
victim, Sandra, is an African-American woman. Therefore, I have placed 
her away from the “White” line, She had also been arrested several times 
as the perpetrator in incidents with the same defendant and on one 
occasion was charged with resisting arrest. Therefore, I have placed her 
far from the heteronormative line. Stereotypes about African-American 
women and other aspects of her individual gender expression place her 
further from those values, as well. In contrast, the unsuccessful victim, 
Madeline, is an American-born Latina for whom English is a first 
language. She had no history of fighting back or being arrested and she 
was very feminine in her gender expression. She also appeared 
traumatized and very vulnerable during her testimony. Because of these 
various features of her expression, I placed her closer to the white and 
heteronormative lines than Sandra. Yet ultimately Sandra was the more 
believable victim. I argue that this is because of the way the identities of 
the defendants played out in the courtroom, as depicted in the slide. 
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Sandra appeared opposite her African-American ex-boyfriend, 
Jerome, and Madeline appeared opposite her ex-husband, Steve, who is 
Latino and non-Latino. Both men were unemployed and again, both had 
been convicted of domestic violence. In the paper, I discuss more 
specifically what kinds of stereotypes were in play with the men in these 
cases and how stereotypes about men of color conform with the 
perceivable perpetrator image, just as stereotypes about women of color 
push them away from conforming with the ideal victim. I also discuss the 
ways in which identity is not static, but is performed within particular 
settings. I do not think we can assume that Steve had an easy court win 
because he was perceived as White, but his race certainly did play a 
factor. While Sandra’s persona did not conform to the perfect victim, 
Jerome’s did not conform to a very limited repertoire of available 
acceptable images for African-American men in this type of setting. That 
left him as what scholar Frank Rudy Cooper calls the bad Black man: a 
quintessential, perceivable perpetrator.4 Although we cannot know 
precisely how the judge reached his decision, the routine operation of 
stereotype suggests that Sandra received her orders for the wrong reasons 
no matter how right it was for her to receive them based on the evidence 
in the case, and Madeline was not awarded supervised visitation based on 
something other than the merits of her case. My conclusion is that if we 
want to dismantle the stereotypes underlying the perfect victim and 
understand the differences in case outcomes such as these, we have to 
acknowledge and dismantle the stereotypes underlying the perceivable 
perpetrator, as well. 
MORRISON: The title of the work-in-progress on which my 
remarks are based is That’s Just Not the Case—The Heteronormativity of 
Separation Based Interventions and Why They Won’t Help End Domestic 
Violence. What I do in this work is to challenge an assumption grounding 
what is the most prominent legal intervention designed to address 
intimate partner violence, that being to separate the parties whether 
through arrest, incarceration, stay away and protective orders or a 
force/required divorce. The assumption inherent in the law’s efforts to 
keep an individual away from a party whom he, and I am being 
purposely gendered here, has abused, is that by doing so a batterer has 
been held accountable for his choosing to be abusive and a victim is safe 
and well on the road to empowerment. The idea is that this leads to 
furthering the anti-domestic violence movement’s goals of ending 
intimate partner and gender-based violence. I argue that separation-based 
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Assimilation, Identity Performance, and Hierarchy, 39 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 853 (2006). 
See also Slide 2. 
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interventions do not hold a batterer accountable, do not create victim 
safety and empowerment and ultimately will not help end domestic 
violence because separation remedies are heteronormative.5 
I am sure that some domestic violence advocates, activists and 
scholars, including some in this room, think that being heteronormative 
is the least of the problems with separation-based remedies and that a 
more pressing issue is that separation remedies regularly fail to do what 
they are designed to do, which is to end violence being perpetrated 
against a particular person at the hands of a current or former intimate 
partner. Leigh Goodmark and others have pointed out that there are 
numerous accounts of separation not even effecting minimal interruption 
to abuse, let alone ending it.6 Martha Mahoney has identified the 
problems with separation by calling attention to the increase in violence 
upon separation.7 My point continues this thread by asserting that even if 
separation actually did stop person X from abusing person Y, every time 
it is utilized it has intended and unintended consequences that help 
perpetuate intimate partner violence because, among other reasons, 
separation-based interventions are heteronormative. 
When I say heteronormative, I mean punitive rules that force us to 
conform to hegemonic, heterosexual, and cisgender8 standards for 
identity and practice. Heteronormativity constructs normative sexualities 
and impacts not only those who are LGBT identified, but also those who 
identify as heterosexual and cisgender. Fundamental to heteronormativity 
are sexual and gender conformity, which are directly counter to gender 
equality. Conformity to sexual and gender norms are socially supported 
aspects of the attitudes and behaviors of a person who chooses to utilize 
abuse—so too is the abuse used to force heteronormative sex and gender 
behaviors upon victims. Heteronormativity and domestic violence are 
similarly problematic in that they both do the following: perpetuate a 
dominant/ subordinate social structure and help maintain patriarchy, both 
of which have as a cornerstone gender conformity, which are part of 
gender subordination. 
                                                                                                         
5 MICHAEL WARNER, FEAR OF A QUEER PLANET: QUEER POLITICS AND SOCIAL THEORY 
xxi-xxv (1993). 
6 LEIGH GOODMARK, A TROUBLED MARRIAGE: DOMESTIC VIOLENCE AND THE LEGAL 
SYSTEM 81 (2012). 
7 Martha R. Mahoney, Legal Images of Battered Women: Redefining the Issue of 
Separation 90 MICH. L. REV. 1 (1991). 
8 The first recorded Usenet post of cisgender was in the alt.transgendered Usenet 
group in May of 1994 by Dana Leland Defosse. In April of 1996, Carl Buijs, a 
transsexual man from the Netherlands said in a Usenet posting “As for the origin; I just 
made it up.” The origin of the term is logically based on the Latin prefixes, in which “cis” 
(“on the same side”) is the opposite of “trans” (“on the opposite side”). These terms find 
use in a range of subjects, including Geometric isomerism in chemistry. 
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I single out separation interventions because they are the most 
prominent way the law works against intimate partner violence. I have 
come to the conclusion that separate interventions may not be completely 
eliminated they may bring about short or even longer-term safety for 
individuals, families and friends being victimized. However, the effects 
of separation can be over punishment. As Jeannie Suk has noted, in 
punishing a misdemeanor, the state has terminated an individuals’ 
relationship or at the very least made maintaining the relationship a 
criminal action.9 Also, separation does not actually prevent or end 
domestic violence. There is nothing prohibiting the abusive individual 
from starting a new relationship and continuing with the old “bad 
behaviors.” The message from the state is essentially, “Try again. Maybe 
you’ll get it right this time.” 
One might argue that criminal law’s utilization of separation actually 
changes the heteronormative structure by prescribing what is and is not 
proper masculine behavior. This argument is that criminal laws are 
broadcasting proper masculinity and thus countering the heteronormative 
rule by articulating that it is not okay to abuse your spouse or girlfriend 
and that if you do, the legal system is going to separate you and possibly 
end your relationship. Arguably, this changes the standard notion of at 
least gender roles and behaviors within a heterosexual relationship. 
However, I argue that the opposite results because the criminal law 
system’s coercive control is only implemented with the victim’s 
involvement, and she is constructed in a particular manner and with a 
particular role. A victim must call the police and cooperate with 
prosecutors and child protective service. It is still the victim, gendered 
woman, who is seen as responsible for what has occurred and is still 
being controlled, this time by the system instead of her partner. 
Fundamentally, what criminal law is attempting to do is to construct the 
way individuals behave with intimate partners and doing so by either 
changing or ending the relationship. However, the relationship is not the 
problem—the batterer’s behavior is. What needs to happen is to get that 
behavior to change. Criminal interventions may not be able to do this and 
separation generally does not accomplish this. Not only is changing a 
relationship not the job of the criminal legal system, it is an impossible 
task for this system. 
State interventions, particularly criminal law based ones, exist in 
order to punish behaviors that are supposed to be harmful to society in 
order to specifically or generally deter, incapacitate, rehabilitate or 
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provide retribution. I argue that if separation based interventions 
accomplish any of these goals, it is only retribution, and it is retribution 
based not on the needs of victims or on anti-subordination ideals, but 
spite. The state is doling out punishment for making it get involved in 
personal affairs. But even if the criminal law system’s responses, 
including separation, stop one particular individual from violating the 
domestic violence statutes of a given state, this does not mean: a) that he 
has abandoned all abusive behaviors, just those that violate the law; b) 
that he has changed mindset about the place or the status of the particular 
woman he is involved with or women as a whole; or c) anything has been 
done to undermine heteronormative-based gender subordination. In the 
paper I explore alternatives such as restorative justice and transformative 
justice. In the end we must ensure that whatever the approach, it is, 
among other priorities, not heteronormative. 
GOEL: My talk today is about female complicity in domestic 
violence. I wanted to look at a type of violence that is usually perceived 
as occurring only in certain countries—violence perpetrated by women 
on other women, not in the context of same-sex relationships, but in 
situations where there is a cultural norm supporting the violence. We see 
it sometimes with female circumcision, female genital mutilation. We 
also see it in India in dowry deaths or bride burnings. I really wanted to 
unpack that and figure out—why we perceive it as being culturally 
entrenched why it happens. Could it help us understand why violence 
against women is an international phenomenon? 
The purpose of this paper is really twofold: first, is to examine that 
phenomenon of violence against women perpetrated by other women in 
that context of dowry deaths and bride burnings; second, to uncover the 
ways in which we limit our understanding of violence against women by 
notions of who the perpetrator is and who the victim is. Our 
understanding of domestic violence, and particularly our understanding 
about violence against women, is a story of worldwide oppression where 
the picture of our victim is female, and the perpetrator of violence is 
usually a man. But some cases defy that understanding and they force us 
to revisit those notions of women and of violence altogether. 
I am struck by the way we approach domestic violence differently in 
different contexts even though we recognize it to be a universal 
phenomenon, and we recognize the world to be universally patriarchal. 
Depending on the context, we problematize it very differently and we 
perceive it very differently. So, I will look at dowry deaths in India. 
There is a phenomenon in India that involves young brides, or women 
who have not been married for a very long time, being subjected to 
harassment, torture, and abuse in the homes of their in-laws. Most are 
living in a joint family system where they live with their husband and his 
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parents. These brides are harassed because they did not bring enough 
dowry or because the groom’s family wants the bride’s parents to 
provide money on an ongoing basis. The bride or the young woman in 
this case is used as leverage. Her parents are quite aware that if they do 
not comply with the requests or demands for money, their daughter will 
have a much more difficult experience in her marital home. 
These brides are harassed for more dowry, abused, and sometimes 
even killed. The most common method of killing in these cases seems to 
be to douse her with kerosene and light her on fire. The in-laws can call 
it a kitchen accident; “she was cooking something, and her sari (six yards 
of fabric she’s wearing) caught on fire, (because in India, all of the cook 
stoves are gas stoves—nobody uses an electric stove) and she was just 
enveloped in flames, there was nothing we could do.” 
In India, we have seen in ten years, 79,404 registered cases of dowry 
death.10 That cannot be happening where the mother-in-law in the home 
does not know. She is either complicit, or she is at least aware and that is 
a very scary thing. Some women who survive have said, “my mother-in-
law was the one who held the match.” We hear horrible stories that in 
fact, the mothers-in-law were involved. 
We are not really sure about the numbers of mothers-in-law who 
participate because we do not have studies on those women who 
participate in these killings and attempted killings. 
It is difficult to determine conclusively why that happens and how 
much it happens. First of all, because the very notion of women killing at 
all is aberrant. It is such a small set of violent crime. The notion of 
women killing other women is so tiny that you cannot even find it in the 
literature; you cannot find a study. 
Why do these women kill? We do have a number of theories, almost 
all of which portray the other woman, the mother-in-law, as also a 
victim: 1) because women are so perpetually devalued that they begin to 
see themselves and other women as worthless and subhuman; 2) because 
oppressing women is a kind of survival mechanism—they know if they 
do not oppress the other woman, they might be oppressed themselves; 3) 
because it is some kind of resistance for them—it is their last grab at 
power in a world where they have no power at all or very little power; 
and 4) we also hear that because it is part of their culture, which is a 
complex interaction of history, religion, social class, social familial 
circumstances, wherein this conduct even though it is not acceptable, it is 
understandable. All four of those theories involve the perpetrator woman 
being some kind of victim. It is only the last theory that includes the idea 
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(2014), available at http://ncrb.gov.in/index.htm. 
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that they are just evil, power hungry, angry people. It is only that one that 
actually involves some full agency on the part of the perpetrator woman. 
I wanted to ask then, how is this qualitatively different than the other 
kinds of female-on-female violence that we are familiar with? 
We actually do have three primary archetypes of women who hurt 
other women. The first archetype is the evil stepmother. The evil 
stepmother is punishable because she cannot love other people’s children 
as she does her own children. She is supposed to be compassionate and 
nurturing, but the evil stepmother sees herself in competition with these 
children for the husband’s resources. The second archetype is the whore-
house madam who exploits other women and their sexual favors for 
monetary profit for herself. It is disconcerting to us that she exploits her 
own kind, but we also find it a little bit admirable because she is 
entrepreneurial and she is exploiting a weakness, the sexual insatiability 
of men. And the third archetype is the evil mother-in-law who is griping 
and controlling because her son has married someone who she thinks is 
not good enough for him. But even this is not an evil mother-in-law who 
will kill. 
So, the real question is how do we respond to this kind of violence? 
We can call it cultural and intractable and do nothing; we can say it is 
cultural and systemic but changeable, and try to change this huge 
problem of attitude toward women and say that the mothers-in-law are 
also victims; or we can consider those women evil, aberrant, and 
deserving of punishment 
We do not have clear ways to understand where the line is between 
victim and offender in the context of women, because for women most of 
our theories limit their agency and describe them as victims, too. Many 
believe the system itself helps to perpetuate violence, they believe that 
we have men who are trapped in a cycle of violence just the way women 
are trapped in a cycle of violence, and yet we still believe that those men 
are in need of punishment, accountability, responsibility, reform, or 
rehabilitation. But unless women fit one of those archetypes, we really 
have no idea what to do with them. We are really stuck with our notion 
of women being victims all the time and the perpetrators always being 
men. So, there are no ways that women can legitimately express their 
anger, their frustration, and their lack of power. Our notions of how 
victims are situated and how offenders are situated prevent us from 
dealing with these particular kinds of violence. 
